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IN LIGHT OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND THE 
DIFFICULT NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS, MARYLAND SHOULD ADOPT 
LEGISLATION MAKING ADMISSIBLE PRIOR ACTS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Veronica Williams's story is all too familiar. Veronica's "picture-
perfect" marriage to Cleaven Williams was shattered on a Friday 
night in January 2005 when Cleaven slapped, choked, and kicked 
Veronica in an upstairs bedroom. 1 As she pleaded with him to stop, 
he pistol whipped her with a .45-caliber handgun and fired a shot at 
her feet, just missing her. 2 Veronica was able to escape the house and 
went to the police, but provided a false name and a false story 
claiming she had just been robbed. 3 
Cleaven fled to the home of a female acquaintance.4 While staying 
there he punched holes in the wall, threw pictures, and attempted to 
rape her; she refused to press charges. 5 While Cleaven fled, Veronica 
left town to visit relatives in another state.6 Cleaven tracked her 
down and brought her back to Maryland assuring her that everything 
would change. 7 
Nothing did change. The physical and emotional abuse continued. 8 
Veronica did not want to leave for fear that her children would live 
without a father. 9 Finally, Veronica worked up the courage to tell 
Cleaven she was leaving again; in retaliation, Cleaven cut off all of 
her hair. 10 
l. Melissa Harris, No Safe Place: In Danger at Home, Let down by the Law, a Woman 
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The story of Veronica Williams ended on the sidewalk outside the 
Baltimore City District Court, where she was filing a protective order 
against Cleaven. 11 Cleaven followed Veronica to the courthouse, 
darted across traffic, and stabbed her multiple times. 12 Several days 
later, Veronica died with her children by her side as doctors removed 
her from a ventilator. 13 Doctors discovered something else, a three-
to-six-week-old fetus with a faint heartbeat. 14 
Although Veronica had pressed charges against Cleaven/5 the 
shooting incident, along with any 911 calls or statements made to 
police and social workers, would have been inadmissible at any 
subsequent trial for domestic violence, hindering a proper 
prosecution. 16 This Comment attempts to address the problems of 
domestic violence prosecutions and provide a recommendation to 
prevent an outcome similar to Veronica Williams's. 
The pervasiveness of domestic violence throughout the United 
States is staggering. According to the United States Department of 
Justice (USDOJ), approximately 1.3 million women are physically 
assaulted by an intimate partner annually. 17 The prevalence of 
domestic violence in Maryland is no less daunting. According to the 
2007 Maryland Uniform Crime Report (UCR), compiled by the 
Maryland State Police, there were a total of 19,391 domestic crimes 






16. See infra Part III.C.2. 
17. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN at iv, 26 
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnij/183781.pdf. Although 
domestic violence can and does affect men and those in homosexual relationships, the 
primary victims are women in heterosexual relationships. See MARYLAND STATE 
POLICE, CRIME IN MARYLAND 2007 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 52, 57 (2007). Therefore, 
throughout this Comment, the victim will be referred to as a woman in a heterosexual 
relationship. 
18. MARYLAND STATE POLICE, supra note 17, at 53. The 2007 level slightly decreased 
from the 2006level of21,965. /d. Baltimore County averaged the highest number of 
domestic violence incidents over a five-year period followed by Baltimore City, 
Prince George's County, and then Montgomery County. /d. at 60. During the five-
year period, an average of20,864 incidents were reported throughout the state. /d. 
Although the UCR provides useful data, the UCR only provides statistics on 
reported domestic violence incidents to local police ~epartments. See id. at 53. 
Therefore, unreported incidents of domestic violence remain unclear. See id. 
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The prosecution of domestic violence cases is difficult for varying 
reasons, including a victim's lack of cooperation or lack of physical 
evidence. 19 Prior to 2004, prosecutors routinely relied on victim 
statements, admitted at trial through a hearsay exception, to 
supplement the lack of physical evidence, the lack of victim 
cooperation, or both.2° Following the 2004 decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Crawford v. Washington/' the customary 
tools of introducing hearsay statements in a domestic violence 
prosecution through a hearsay exception has become limited.22 
Crawford holds that hearsay statements deemed "testimonial" violate 
the Sixth Amendment and cannot be admitted at trial. 23 In the context 
of domestic violence cases, Crawford and its progeny have severely 
limited the prosecution's ability to admit a victim's hearsay 
statements because they routinely fall under the Supreme Court's 
definition of testimonial. 24 
Moreover, current evidence law in Maryland prohibits the 
introduction of a defendant's past acts of domestic violence.25 This 
prohibition affects domestic violence prosecutions because domestic 
violence is a highly recidivistic crime; prosecutors would like to use 
past acts of domestic violence to show that the defendant committed 
the same crime before and therefore is more likely to have committed 
the current charge.26 The Crawford decision and subsequent cases, 
paired with Maryland evidence law banning a defendant's prior acts 
of domestic violence admission into evidence, limits the tools 
available to prosecutors in already difficult domestic violence 
prosecutions, tipping the balance at trial heavily in favor of the 
defendant. 
Part II of this Comment briefly defmes domestic violence and 
describes the difficulties faced in prosecuting domestic violence cases 
and the hearsay tools that are commonly used to combat those 
difficulties. 27 
19. See infra Part Il.B. 
20. See infra Part II. B. 
21. 541 u.s. 36 (2004). 
22. See infra Part Ill. C. 
23. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
24. Infra Part III.C.2. 
25. MD. R. 5-404. 
26. Infra Part III.D.l. 
27. Infra Part II. 
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Part III details the admissibility of hearsay in domestic violence 
prosecutions under Crawford and its progeny.28 Next, Part ill 
describes the current Maryland law on admitting past acts of 
domestic violence in a case for a current domestic violence charge. 29 
Part III concludes by highlighting California Evidence Code section 
1109 and similar statutes from other states that make admissible a 
defendant's past acts of domestic violence in a current charge for 
domestic violence. 30 
Part IV argues that in light of the Crawford decision, coupled with 
current evidence law banning a defendant's past acts of domestic 
violence and the difficult nature of domestic violence prosecutions, 
the balance at trial has tipped heavily in the defendant's favor and is 
obscuring the search for the truth. 31 Therefore, Part IV also argues 
that Maryland should adopt a statute similar to section 1109.32 The 
recidivistic nature of domestic violence and past acts' predictability 
of future acts of domestic violence support the inference that prior 
acts of domestic violence infer guilt on the current charge. 33 In 
addition, Part IV analyzes the positive aspects of section 1109 and the 
proposal, including their ability to protect the defendant's rights. 34 
By adopting such a proposal, the prosecution will have a tool to bring 
the balance at trial back to equilibrium. The overall goal of this 
Comment is to shed light on the problems of domestic violence 
prosecutions and encourage the Maryland General Assembly to take 
action. 
II. THE PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS 
A. Domestic Violence Definition 
Domestic violence is prevalent nationwide as well as throughout 
Maryland. 35 The question remains, what exactly is domestic 
violence? Domestic violence does not have one specific definition; 
various states and the federal government provide their own 
definitions. Under Maryland law, a victim of domestic violence is 
defined as "an individual who has received deliberate, severe, and 
28. Infra Part liLA-C. 
29. Infra Part III.D.l. 
30. Infra Part III.D.2.a-b. 
31. Infra Part N. 
32. Infra Part N. 
33. Infra Part N. 
34. Infra Part N. 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
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demonstrable physical injury, or is in fear of imminent deliberate, 
severe, and demonstrable physical injury from a current or former 
spouse, or a current or former cohabitant. "36 From another 
perspective, the USDOJ defines domestic violence as "a pattern of 
abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to 
gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.'m 
Although the definitions differ, the ultimate goal is to identify the 
same type of victim. 
B. Difficulties Prosecuting Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence is a serious problem with grave ramifications. 
Domestic violence can cause the victim psychological distress, 
resulting in problems with future relationships and future 
victimization.38 Allowed to continue, domestic violence can impact 
children physically and increase the likelihood that the child who 
witnessed domestic violence will become abused in the future. 39 
Ultimately and tragically, domestic violence can end with spousal 
murder. 40 
Many argue that prosecutions, by placing the abuser in jail or 
counseling, are necessary to decrease the prevalence of domestic 
36. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-513 (LexisNexis 2006). 
37. USDOJ: Office on Violence Against Women, About Domestic Violence, http://www. 
ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). The U.S. Department of 
Justice describes five different sub-categories of domestic violence. !d. First, 
physical abuse, which involves hitting but can also involve forced drug use or the 
denial of medical care. !d. Second, sexual abuse, which involves coercion in sexual 
contact or behavior such as marital rape. !d. Third, emotional abuse, which involves 
the weakening of an individual's self-worth through acts including constant criticism. 
!d. Fourth, economic abuse, which involves financial dependency by controlling all 
fmancial aspects of a person. !d. Finally, psychological abuse, which is fear through 
intimidation by threatening harm to the individual, her children, or her family and 
friends. !d. 
38. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1221, 1224--25 
(1993). 
39. Tonya McCormick, Note and Comment, Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When 
the Victim Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. Pus. L. 427,429-30 (1999). 
40. Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Crime Data Brief(U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2003, at 1-2, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/content/pub/pd£'ipv0l.pdf. In 2000, throughout the United States, 1247 women 
were killed by an intimate partner. !d. This figure accounts for 33.5% of murders of 
all women in 2000. !d. In Maryland, thirty of the domestic violence incidents 
resulted in homicide. MARYLAND STATE POLICE, supra note 17, at 61. 
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violence and, in turn, its effects as described above.41 However, 
convictions can be hard to obtain.42 A primary reason for this 
difficulty is that victims of domestic violence, after initially 
cooperating with the police, sometimes refuse to cooperate-
testifying on behalf of the batterer, requesting a dismissal of the 
charges, refusing to testify, recanting, or generally refusing to assist 
the prosecution. 43 Some evidence suggests that eighty to ninety 
percent of domestic violence victims will recant at some point.44 
The victim's lack of cooperation can be traced to the significant 
control that the batterer exerts over the victim. One theory describing 
the control in an abusive relationship is the "cycle of violence."45 
The cycle of violence, initially described by Lenore Walker in 1979, 
consists of three stages: the tension-building phase, the acute 
battering phase, and the tranquil-loving phase often referred to as the 
honeymoon phase. 46 The tension-building phase involves minor 
abusive incidents.47 Although the victim tries to please the abuser, 
the incidents evolve into the acute-battering phase where the most 
violent attacks occur, ending only at the desire of the abuser. 48 
Finally, in the honeymoon phase, the batterer will express regret for 
41. J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International 
Criminal Court, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 363, 382 (2007). 
42. Tragically, prosecutions for domestic violence have come too late for many victims. 
Among those incarcerated for spousal abuse in state prisons, fifty percent are there for 
spousal murder. MATIHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 3 
(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf!fvs.pdf. 
43. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 768 (2005); 
Jennifer Gentile Long, Prosecuting Intimate Partner Sexual Assault, 10 CONNECTIONS 
22, 24-25 (2008). This differs from assaults where the victim does not know the 
perpetrator and is more willing to cooperate. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the 
Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996). 
44. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 43, at 768; Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the 
Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' 
Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. I, 3 
(2002) ("The head of the Family Violence Division of the Los Angeles District 
Attorney's Office estimates that ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant."); 
De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 367 ("(V]ictims of domestic violence are uncooperative 
in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases."). 
45. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104 (Springer Publ'g Co. 
1984). 
46. !d. at 95; see McCormick, supra note 39, at 431; Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down 
the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance over Form in Personalized Abuse, 14 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 508 (2008). 
47. Rachmilovitz, supra note 46, at 508. 
48. /d. 
2010] In Light of Crawford 473 
his behavior, often swearing it will not happen again. 49 The victim 
will believe that her abuser will revert to the man that he was when 
she first started the relationship.50 However, this phase will 
eventually yield to the tension-building phase, repeating the cycle 
over again.51 The cycle of violence is one theory that explains the 
recidivism in domestic violence. 52 Prosecution most likely occurs 
after the battering incident in the acute-battering phase;53 by the time 
the prosecution is underway, the victim will have progressed to the 
honeymoon phase where she forgives the abuser and will be less 
willing to cooperate with prosecutors.54 
Although Walker's theory is helpful in understanding domestic 
violence relationships, the cookie-cutter description has often been 
criticized as an inaccurate description of every abusive relationship. 55 
Other scholars have theorized that innate in every domestic violence 
relationship is "coercive control."56 That is, throughout the 
relationship there is "an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation 
and control that extends to all areas of [the victim's] life, including 
access to food, money, help, protection, friendships, family and 
children; work; transportation; control over her own sexuality; and 
the minutiae of every day life."57 The high level of control in the 
relationship leads the victim to have less autonomy and 
independence, leading to a diminished ability to seek help or assist in 
a prosecution. 58 
49. McCormick, supra note 39, at 431. 
50. /d. 
51. Rachrnilovitz, supra note 46, at 508. 
52. /d. 
53. See Pamela Vartabedian, Comment, The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable: 
Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 47 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 157, 159.....{)0 (2007). 
54. See id. at 160. 
55. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense: An 
Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 65, 75 (2008); Megan G. 
Thompson, Comment, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: Reformulating 
the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REv. 599, 615 (2007). 
56. See Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence 
Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 8-10 
(2007). This theory was first articulated by Susan Schechter and built upon by Evan 
Stark. /d. 
57. /d. at 10. A helpful visual tool to explain the control in a domestic violence 
relationship is the power and control wheel. See id. at 9. The Domestic Abuse 
Intervention Project in Duluth, Minnesota developed the power and control wheel, 
and domestic violence experts routinely use it. /d. at 19 n.39. 
58. See id. at 10. 
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Aside from control, a victim's refusal to cooperate with the 
prosecution may also stem from the fear of retaliation by the 
barterer. 59 Studies have shown that the most dangerous time for a 
victim is when she attempts to break free from a violent relationship 
and seek prosecution. 60 
Other factors also cause a victim to recant or refuse to testify, 
further hindering domestic violence prosecutions. The victim may 
have an economic dependence on her abuser and fear that she would 
be unable to independently provide for herself or her children. 61 
Additional factors include: continued emotional attachment; 
reluctance to break up families, including fear that children will be 
placed into state custody; religious and cultural views; "'learned 
helplessness"' based on repeated abuse; and, a genuine belief that 
things have gotten better, specifically during the honeymoon phase of 
the cycle of abuse. 62 In Maryland, the law even allows a spousal 
victim of domestic violence a one-time refusal to testify. 63 Lastly, in 
the most extreme cases, victim cooperation is absent because the 
domestic violence assault resulted in the victim's death.64 
It is difficult to prosecute domestic violence without victim 
cooperation. Domestic violence cases often leave scant physical 
evidence (i.e. physical evidence, such as bruises or scratches, have 
not materialized or a delay in reporting the domestic abuse causes 
physical evidence to dissipate) that, even when present, can be 
interpreted in many different ways. 65 When physical evidence of 
abuse is lacking, prosecutors rely heavily on hearsay statements to 
explain what occurred.66 Hearsay is used to "'connect the dots'" 
when the victim does not testify.67 For example, a victim's statement 
to a responding police officer that the abuser "'kicked [me] in the 
leg"' and "'grabbed [me] around the neck"' would be used to 
describe, in lieu of a testifying victim, what occurred. 68 Without the 
59. See Lininger, supra note 43, at 769 (noting a study which found that thirty percent of 
batterers assault their victims during the predisposition phase of prosecution). 
60. Jd. 
61. I d. This fear may be more of a reality; fifty percent of battered women drop below the 
poverty line after leaving their abusers. Jd. Also, a study has found that in forty-two 
percent of cases, batterers threatened to reduce economic support in retaliation for 
continued assistance with the prosecution. ld. at 769-70. 
62. Jd. at 770. 
63. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 9-106(a)(2)(iii) (LexisNexis 2006). 
64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
65. Lininger, supra note 43, at 771. 
66. See id. at 771-72. 
67. Jd. at 771. 
68. See State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 309, 965 A.2d 75, 77 (2009). 
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hearsay statements "[t]he quantum of proof ... may be so low that 
the absence of hearsay necessitates dismissal."69 
For many years, hearsay statements by a victim who refused to 
cooperate with the prosecution had been admissible at trial through 
various exceptions.70 However, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Crawford v. Washington11 has limited the admissibility of hearsay 
statements in prosecutions for domestic violence. 72 
III. THE CURRENT LAW: CRAWFORD, HEARSAY 
EXCEPTIONS, AND THE PROPENSITY RULE 
A. Hearsay and Hearsay Exceptions 
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."73 The declarant is the 
person making the statement.74 Generally, a hearsay statement is 
inadmissible at trial. 75 The hearsay rule is intended to prevent a 
statement's admission into evidence where the cross-examiner has 
not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and expose 
weaknesses in the statement, such as defects in perception, memory, 
and sincerity, as well as defects in transmission of the statement. 76 
There are, however, numerous exceptions and exemptions to the 
69. Lininger, supra note 43, at 771. The use of hearsay in a domestic violence trial also 
has other benefits. It abates the motivation for an abuser to intimidate the victim 
while waiting for trial. !d. If live testimony were used, the victim would be subject to 
constant intimidation to change her testimony and cause a dismissal. !d. at 771-72. 
Also, by not testifying, the victim gets a reprieve from reliving the trauma of the 
incident upon prosecution and defense questioning. !d. 
70. See infra Part III.B. 
71. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
72. See infra Part Ill. C. I. 
73. Mo. R. 5-SOI(c). A "statement" is defmed as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." !d. 5-
801(a). 
74. !d. 5-SOI(b). 
75. !d. 5-802. If a statement is not used for its truth then it is admissible under the hearsay 
rule. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 150 (Thomson West 4th ed. 
2006). For example, a statement by a driver that a car had defective brakes can be 
used to show that the driver knew the car had defective brakes, but not for the purpose 
of proving that the car did indeed have defective brakes. See id. 
76. LILLY, supra note 75, at 140, 142. 
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hearsay rule,77 some of which, as discussedd below, are relevant to 
the admission of a domestic violence victim's hearsay statement. 
B. Pre-Crawford: Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions 
Prior to Crawford, prosecutors would generally rely on five types 
of hearsay statements: 911 calls, statements made to responding 
officers or paramedics, formal statements given to police after their 
initial response, statements made to individuals other than the police 
(i.e. social workers, friends, or doctors), and dying declarations.78 
These hearsay statements would generally be admitted under the 
excited utterance hearsay exception or the dying declaration 
exception in homicide prosecutions. 79 
In cases prior to Crawford,80 excited utterances and dying 
declarations were commonly admitted against defendants 
77. See id. at 166-268. Some exceptions require unavailability of the declarant, while 
others do not. Compare Mo. R. 5-804(b) (providing that the exceptions contained 
therein are applicable only when the declarant is unavailable to testify), with MD. R. 
5-803 (providing that under certain circumstances, a statement will not be excluded 
even though the declarant is unavailable to testify). Maryland Rule 5-804(a) defines 
"unavailability." 
78. Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a "Get Out of Jail Free" Card for Batterers and 
Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of "Testimonial," 84 OR. L. REv. 
1093, 1113-14 (2005). 
79. See Lininger, supra note 43, at 776. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2) codifies the excited 
utterance exception and makes admissible "[a] statement relating to a startling event 
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition." Mo. R. 5-803(b)(2). Underlying the excited utterance 
exception in a domestic violence case is the theory that the circumstances of an assault 
on the victim would produce enough excitement to still the victim's ability to reflect 
and fabricate. FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. 
Maryland Rule 5-804(b )(2) codifies the dying declaration exception and makes 
admissible "a statement made by a declarant, while believing that the declarant's death 
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed 
to be his or her impending death." Mo. R. 5-804(b)(2). Unlike the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, in Maryland, the dying declaration exception applies not only in a homicide 
or civil action, but also in an "attempted homicide [and] assault with intent to commit 
a homicide." Mo. R. 5-804(b)(2); see also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2) (providing that the 
dying declaration exception applies "[i]n a prosecution for homicide or in a civil 
action"). 
Some domestic violence prosecutions also use the present sense impression 
exception, which makes admissible "[a] statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or 
immediately thereafter." Mo. R. 5-803(b)(l). 
80. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,81 as 
long as there was "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' and a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception.82 "Suffice to say, if a hearsay statement 
was admissible under the rules of evidence, it almost always satisfied 
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation."83 
C. Crawford and the Change to Domestic Violence Prosecutions' 
Use of Hearsay 
1. The Crawford Decision 
In 2004, the Supreme Court reexamined the Confrontation Clause 
in Crawford v. Washington. 84 In an opinion written by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, the Court expressly overruled Ohio v. Roberts85 and 
created a holding that would have lasting effects on the introduction 
of hearsay statements at trial for all types of prosecutions, including 
domestic violence prosecutions. 86 
Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder 
for trying to stab a man who allegedly raped his wife. 87 Crawford 
claimed self-defense, stating that the victim reached for a weapon 
first. 88 However, in a taped interrogation, Crawford's wife gave a 
different account in which she stated that the victim did not have a 
weapon in his hand.89 At trial, Crawford's wife refused to testify, 
81. See, e.g., Byron L. Warnken, "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing" After Crawford v. 
Washington: Maryland's Approach Best Preserves the Right to Confrontation, 37 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 203, 205--07 (2008); Tracey L. Perrick, Comment, Crawford v. 
Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact Across the 
United States and in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 133, 135-36 (2005). 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. One of the benefits of the Sixth Amendment, 
which is similar to the reasoning of the hearsay rule, is that it requires a face-to-face 
confrontation allowing cross-examination to expose discrepancies in a witness' 
testimony. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). In domestic 
violence cases where hearsay statements are used in lieu of or in addition to the 
victim's statement, defendants can argue that they are deprived of a chance to cross-
examine and confront the victim and expose flaws in their testimony. 
82. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. 
83. Warnken, supra note 81, at 205. 
84. 541 U.S. 36,42 (2004). 
85. See id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
86. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 143. 
87. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-40. 
88. See id. at 38-39. 
89. /d. at 39-40. 
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claiming marital privilege. 90 The prosecution proffered her taped 
interrogation into evidence in lieu of her live testimony. 91 Crawford 
argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated 
because he was unable to confront his wife.92 However, the trial 
court admitted the testimony under the Roberts standard, finding that 
it was reliable.93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the statement violated the Confrontation Clause.94 
Justice Scalia seized the opportunity to build on his dissent in 
Maryland v. Craig95 and change the landscape of Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation cases.96 In Crawford, the Court abandoned the 
Roberts test.97 First, the Court examined English law98 to discern the 
Framers' intent when contemplating the Sixth Amendment.99 The 
Court determined that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, 
and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
the accused."100 The Court stated that the focus of the Sixth 
Amendment is to allow the defendant to confront a witness whose 
words "bear testimony."101 
Thus, the Court held that testimonial statements are inadmissible 
when the witness is unavailable and there was no prior opportunity 
for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. 102 The Court's 
holding effectively rejected the Roberts test of "adequate indicia of 
90. !d. at 40. 
91. See id. The hearsay exception that the prosecution used was "statement against penal 
interest." !d. (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)). 
92. !d. 
93. /d. ("The trial court here admitted the statement on the latter ground, offering several 
reasons why it was trustworthy: [Crawford's wife] was not shifting blame but rather 
corroborating her husband's story that he acted in self-defense or 'justified reprisal'; 
she had direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she 
was being questioned by a 'neutral' law enforcement officer."). 
94. !d. at 42. 
95. 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that on a case-by-case basis and a finding of necessity 
to protect a child witness, a child witness may testify through a closed circuit 
television and will not violate the Sixth Amendment). 
96. See id. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Warnken, supra note 81, at 208-09. 
97. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-64. 
98. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 13~1 (discussing the English law the Court used to 
interpret the Sixth Amendment). 
99. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-4 7. 
I 00. !d. at 50. 
101. /d. at 51 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). The Court described testimony as a '"solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' !d. 
102. !d. at 68. 
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reliability." 103 The Court reasoned that allowing a judge to 
subjectively determine what is reliable takes away the primary virtue 
of the Sixth Amendment, which is to allow the jury to determine the 
reliability of the statement through cross-examination. 104 The Court 
explained the failing of the Roberts test: "The unpardonable vice of 
the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its 
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 105 That is, 
testimonial statements from a witness who the defendant has not had 
an opportunity to cross-examine. 
The Court put off defining the exact boundaries of which 
statements are testimonial, "leav[ing] for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'"106 However, 
having found that Crawford's wife's statements to the poiice were 
testimonial, it can be inferred that testimonial statements to police are 
a category of statements that are inadmissible at trial when the 
witness is unavailable for cross-examination. 107 The Court also stated 
that, at minimum, the Sixth Amendment "applies . . . to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 
trial; and to police interrogations."108 Subsequent cases have defined 
and shaped the definition of testimonial and have had a primary 
effect on domestic violence cases, where testimonial statements are 
often introduced at trial to take the place of a witness who is 
unavailable. 109 
2. The Crawford Decision and its Progeny's Effect on Domestic 
Violence Hearsay Tools 
The Crawford decision and its new standard significantly affects 
the types of hearsay statements prosecutors use to introduce evidence 
in domestic violence prosecutions. 110 
103. See id. at 60-65. 
104. See id. at 62. 
105. /d. at 63. 
106. !d. at 68. 
107. !d. at 52, 68. The Court drew the comparison that statements made to the police in the 
course of interrogations are similar to examinations by justices of the peace in 
England-statements that the Framers wished to exclude by implementing the Sixth 
Amendment. See id. at 52-53. 
108. /d. at 68. 
109. See infra Part III.C.2. 
110. See supra Part III.B. Crawford only has a bearing on domestic violence prosecutions 
when the victim refuses to testify. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 144. If the victim 
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a. 911 calls 
As previously discussed, 911 calls are a primary tool prosecutors 
use in domestic violence cases where the victim is unavailable. 111 
The leading case to determine whether a 911 call is testimonial under 
Crawford is Davis v. Washington. 112 In Davis, Justice Scalia took the 
opportunity to elaborate on the definition of "testimonial." 113 
Michelle McCottry, the victim of an alleged domestic assault at the 
hands of Davis, phoned 911."4 After an initial hang-up and a call-
back by the 911 operator, McCottry sought assistance from the 
police. 115 After it was clear that Davis had vacated the scene, the 
operator continued to ask McCottry questions about the incident. 116 
At trial, McCottry did not testify and was thus considered 
"unavailable."117 The prosecution sought to introduce a recording of 
the 911 call over Davis's objection on the grounds that it violated his 
right to confrontation. 118 
testifies at trial, she has made herself available for cross-examination and thus no 
Confrontation Clause issue exists. See id. 
Ill. See supra Part lii.B. 
112. 547 u.s. 813 (2006). 
113. See id. at 817. 
114. /d. 
115. /d. at 817-18. The relevant conversation between the 911 operator and Michelle 
McCottry was as follows: 
911 Operator: What's going on? 
Complainant: He's herejumpin' [sic] on me again. 
911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking? 
Complainant: No. 
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I've got help started. Stay on the 
line with me, okay? 
Complainant: I'm on the line. 
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last 
name? 
Complainant: It's Davis. 
911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what's his first name? 
Complainant: Adrian. 
911 Operator: Okay. What's his middle initial? 
Complainant: Martell. He's runnin' [sic] now. 
Jd. at817-18. 
116. /d. at 818. 
117. /d. at 819. 
118. /d. 
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The Court had to decide whether the 911 call was considered 
testimonial under Crawford. 119 The Court compared McCottry's 
statements to the interrogation in Crawford. 120 It noted that 
statements such as McCottry's, made when it is clear that there is an 
ongoing emergency, are not testimonial. 121 The Court reasoned that 
statements made when the witness is seeking help are not the same as 
statements made when a witness is testifying; 122 therefore, the 
protections that Crawford and the Sixth Amendment provide are not 
applicable. 123 
The Court described the type of statement that can be classified as 
an ongomg emergency: 
McCottry's call was plainly a call for help against bona fide 
physical threat . . . . [T]he nature of what was asked and 
answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that 
the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve 
the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in 
Crawford) what had happened in the past. 124 
The Court also noted the differences between the calm, station-
house interview in Crawford versus McCottry' s "frantic" answers in 
an unsafe environment. 125 The Court did note, however, that in some 
circumstances, statements made during an ongoing emergency could 
evolve into testimonial statements-a conversation that begins as an 
inquiry into whether emergency assistance is needed can "'evolve 
into testimonial statements' once that purpose has been achieved." 126 
For example, in Davis, McCottry's responses to the operator's 
"battery of [subsequent' questions" posed after the operator obtained 
the information needed to address the ongoing emergency, "were 
testimonial, not unlike the 'structured police questioning' that 
occurred in Crawford." 121 
What does this mean for domestic violence prosecutions? After 
Davis, if a prosecutor wants to admit into evidence a recording of a 
911 call when the witness is not available for cross-examination, the 
119. Jd. at 823. 
120. Jd. at 827. 
121. Jd. at 828. 
122. Jd. ("No 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help."). 
123. See id. 
124. Jd. at 827. 
125. Jd. 
126. ld. at 828 (citation omitted). 
127. Jd. at 828-29. 
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statement must have been made when an ongoing emergency was 
present. 128 If the statement becomes a narrative and is more akin to 
the victim "testifying" rather than seeking help, the statement cannot 
be admitted into evidence. 129 While many portions of 911 calls can 
still be readily admitted into evidence under Davis, many recordings 
are excluded if a judge finds that the emergency had ended. 130 
b. Statements to responding or investigating officers 
Prior to Davis and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana, 131 there 
was an open question as to whether statements made to officers 
responding to a domestic disturbance or statements made to an 
investigating officer who had returned to conduct an investigation 
were testimonial. 132 
In Hammon, the Court examined the admissibility of statements 
made to police in a non-emergency situation. 133 Police responded to a 
domestic violence call. 134 Upon arrival, the officers separated the 
husband, Hershel Hammon, and his wife, Amy Hammon. 135 An 
officer asked Amy what had happened and Amy stated that she was 
not in any immediate danger. 136 Still, the officer had Amy fill out an 
affidavit describing the domestic assault. 137 At trial, Amy was 
subpoenaed but did not appear. 138 Hammon objected to the use of the 
affidavit, admitted through the "present sense impression" hearsay 
exception. 139 Hammon also objected to testimony admitted through 
the "excited utterance" exception from an officer indicating that Amy 
stated that Hammon was irate. 140 Nevertheless, the trial court 
admitted the evidence over Hammon's objection. 141 
The Supreme Court held that the affidavit and Amy's statements to 
the officer were testimonial. 142 The Court reasoned that there was no 
128. See id. at 828. 
129. See id. 
130. Seeid. 
131. 547 u.s. 813 (2006). 
132. See id. at 81 7. 
133. !d. at 829. 
134. !d. at 819. 
135. !d. at 819-20. 
136. !d. at 830. 





142. See id. at 829-30. 
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emergency; in fact, Amy had informed the officer that "there was no 
immediate threat to her person."143 The Court stated: 
When the officer questioned Amy . . . and elicited the 
challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as 
in Davis) 'what is happening,' but rather 'what happened.' 
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, 
purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible 
crime-which is, of course, precisely what the officer 
should have done. 144 
Hammon is an example of when an ongoing emergency has 
dissipated and a once non-testimonial environment quickly turned 
testimonial. 145 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that when a 
responding officer arrives, if there is no ongoing emergency, the 
statements made to the responding officer are testimonial. 146 This 
further means that any statement made to an officer who is 
investigating a crime rather than responding to a call for help will be 
held inadmissible. 147 Post Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, it is clear 
that there is greater difficulty introducing domestic violence victims' 
hearsay statements made to responding and investigating police 
officers. 148 
c. Statements made to persons other than police officers 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a domestic violence 
victim's statements to social workers, medical personnel, friends, or 
relatives are testimonial. However, the Court of Appeals of 
143. /d. 
144. /d. at 830. 
145. /d. at 828-29. 
146. /d. at 822. 
147. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the recent decision State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 
965 A.2d 75 (2009), addressed a factual scenario that closely paralleled Hammon. 
Where two police officers had separated the abuser and victim in a domestic violence 
incident, the responding officer's questions of'"What happened?"' and '"Where [did 
you get] the marks?'" were held not to be enabling the police to meet an ongoing 
emergency because any threat was already under control and the primary purpose was 
to "prove past events . . . relevant to later criminal prosecution"; therefore, the 
victim's statements to the police were testimonial. /d. at 326, 965 A.2d at 87. 
148. Lininger, supra note 43, at 776. "[A] survey of West Coast prosecutors found that 
since the Crawford ruling, [eighty-seven] percent of respondents have encountered 
greater difficulty in introducing victims' hearsay statements elicited by investigation 
officers at the scene of the alleged domestic abuse." /d. 
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Maryland confronted the issue in State v. Snowden. 149 In Snowden, 
the State sought to admit statements made by child abuse victims to a 
social worker through the "tender years" statute, which allows social 
workers to testify in place of child abuse victims. 150 The defendant 
objected to the admission of the social worker's testimony, claiming 
that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 151 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the crux of the 
question is whether the victim's statements to the social worker were 
part of a formal interrogation. 152 Courts differ on defining an 
interrogation; some courts will look to the intent of the parties 
involved in the conversation, placing emphasis on whether there was 
intent to gather evidence. 153 Other courts examine factors such as 
formality, an adversarial relationship, who initiated the conversation, 
and passive listening to determine if a statement to a responding 
officer is testimonial. 154 In Snowden, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland provided its own definition of what constitutes an 
interrogation: 
No matter what other motives exist, if a statement is made 
under such circumstances that would lead an objective 
person to believe that statements made in response to 
government interrogation later would be used at trial, the 
admission of those statements must be conditioned upon 
Crawford's requirements of unavailability and a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine. 155 
The court held the statements in Snowden to be testimonial because 
the children were brought to the social worker for the express 
purpose of developing testimony for trial and were interviewed in 
order to develop their testimony for trial. 156 The court also stated that 
"an ordinary person in the position of any of the declarants would 
have anticipated the sense that [their] statements to the sexual abuse 
149. 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 
150. /d. at 73, 867 A.2d at 319. 
151. ld 
152. See id. at 82-83, 867 A.2d at 324-25. 
153. See, e.g., United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-{)2 (S.D. Ind. 2004); State 
v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (N.C. 2004). 
154. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 140-48. 
155. Snowden, 385 Md. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. 
156. /d. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 325-26. 
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investigator potentially would have been used to 'prosecute' [the 
defendant]." 157 
The Snowden decision means that, in Maryland, a domestic 
violence victim's statements to a social worker will be inadmissible if 
police bring the victim to a social worker, or the victim objectively 
believes that the questions asked by the social worker would be used 
at trial against the alleged abuser. 158 
As for medical personnel, the Snowden court noted in dicta that 
some courts have found victim statements to medical physicians to be 
non-testimonial. 159 The court suggested that if the child abuse 
victims had been brought to the social worker for medical or 
psychological treatment, the outcome may have been different. 160 
The key to determining whether a statement to medical personnel is 
investigatory in nature or non-testimonial is whether the victim is 
seeking medical assistance or whether the goal of the conversation is 
to investigate past events. 161 In domestic violence prosecutions, this 
means that a victim's statements made to doctors are most likely 
admissible when the statements were made to obtain a medical 
157. /d. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 325-26. It should be noted that Snowden was decided 
before Hammon and Davis. It is the author's opinion that, if taking the case now, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland may approach the analysis differently, holding instead 
that when the social worker spoke with the child, there was no ongoing emergency 
and therefore the statements were testimonial. 
158. See id. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. Because of Maryland's statutory law, which requires 
police officers to refer domestic violence victims to social workers, Maryland social 
workers have substantial contact with domestic violence victims and therefore the 
admissibility of statements made to social workers is highly relevant. MD. CoDE 
ANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-503(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
159. Snowden, 385 Md. at 91, 867 A.2d at 330 (citing State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 
291-92 (Neb. 2004)). 
160. See id. 
161. Compare State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006) (holding that .a kidnapping 
victim's statements to a volunteer emergency medical technician were non-testimonial 
because the statements did not identify her assailant and were pertinent to the medical 
technician's treatment of the victim), and Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 
(holding that a victim's statements to a social worker were testimonial because the 
victims were not brought to the social worker for medical or psychological purposes), 
and State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006) (holding that statements made to a 
nurse at a hospital working for a rape victim unit were not testimonial because the 
primary purpose of the statements were for medical diagnosis; the fact that the rape 
unit collects evidence for prosecutions was immaterial because the primary purpose 
was medical treatment), with Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (holding that 
a rape victim's statement to a sexual assault nurse was testimonial because the nurse 
was a police operative who gathered evidence for the prosecution). 
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diagnosis or if the victim's statements were in response to a doctor's 
inquiry of how the patient was injured. 162 
As for statements made to private individuals, such as friends or 
relatives who are not agents of the government, Crawford normally 
would not apply; the goal of Crawford is to prevent government 
involvement in the creation of testimony. 163 For example, the 
statement of '"daddy beat me"' made by a child to his mother would 
be non-testimonial. 164 However, a victim's statements made to a 
private individual can be testimonial if the victim makes the 
statement to the private individual with the goal of prosecution m 
mind. 165 
d. Dying Declarations 
As previously discussed, the dying declarations hearsay exception 
may be used to admit a domestic abuse victim's statement in a 
homicide prosecution, and in Maryland, for certain other crimes as 
well. 166 The Supreme Court in Crawford briefly discussed this 
hearsay exception. The Court noted that "(a]lthough many dying 
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting 
even those that clearly are." 167 The Court continued by stating, "[w]e 
need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment 
incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this 
162. Perrick, supra note 81, at 147. For example, a statement made to a doctor would be 
testimonial if the medical personnel was an operative of the police. See Medina, 143 
P.3d at 476. 
163. Chase, supra note 78, at 1120. 
164. State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 745 (N.J. 2006); see also Medina, 143 P.3d 471 (holding 
that a victim's statements to a neighbor regarding rape were not testimonial in nature); 
Patano v. State, 138 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2006) (holding that statements to a father about a 
sexual assault were not testimonial). One court has pointed out that it is open for 
interpretation as to whether statements made to private individuals are testimonial. 
State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311,324 n.lO (W.Va. 2006). 1n Mechling, where a 
domestic violence victim made statements to a neighbor that the defendant had beat 
her, the court noted that the Davis decision relied on cases where statements made to 
private individuals would have been testimonial. /d. The court also noted that in 
Davis, the Supreme Court warned readers not to infer that statements lacking any 
interrogation are automatically non-testimonial. /d. 
165. State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 93 & n.8 (Wash. 2006). See Richard D. Friedman, 
Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 260 (2005) 
("If the declarant anticipates that the statement, or the information asserted in it, will 
be conveyed to the authorities and used in prosecution, then it is testimonial, whether 
it is made directly to the authorities or not."). 
166. See supra Part Ill. B. 
167. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
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exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis."168 
Therefore, Crawford has impacted dying declarations the least among 
the exceptions. 169 
e. Forfeiture by wrongdoing 
Because Crawford has limited the ways in which prosecutors can 
introduce statements of domestic violence victims, prosecutors have 
increasingly relied on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception that the 
Crawford Court acknowledged. 170 The forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception allows "the prosecution [to] admit out-of-court statements, 
despite the unavailability of the witness, if the defendant's wrongful 
conduct procured the witness's unavailability through intimidation, 
coercion, and/or violence."171 
In Giles v. California, 172 the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception survives Crawford. In Giles, the 
defendant shot and killed his ex -girlfriend. 173 At trial, Giles claimed 
self-defense. 174 To rebut the defense, the prosecution sought to 
introduce statements that the victim had made to a police officer 
responding to a domestic disturbance call three weeks earlier. 175 In 
those statements, the victim said that the two had argued, Giles had 
assaulted her, and he "threatened to kill her." 176 Over Giles's 
objection that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was 
violated, the trial court admitted the statements under a California 
provision that permits the introduction of out-of-court statements 
describing the threat of actual or physical injury of a declarant when 
the declarant is unavailable. 177 
The Court held that when a declarant is unavailable because of the 
defendant's actions or acquiescence, the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to the Confrontation Clause applies only when there was 
intent on the part of the defendant to procure the declarant's 
unavailability. 178 The Court explained that "intent" exists "'if the 
168. Id. 
169. Chase, supra note 78, at 1122. 
170. Warnken, supra note 81, at 229. 
171. Jd. at218. 
172. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
173. Id. at 2681. 
1-74. Id. 
175. /d.at2681-82. 
176. Id. at 2682. 
177. See CAL. Evm. CODE§ 1370 (West 2009); Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. 
178. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687-88. 
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defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness 
unavailable. "'179 
The Court addressed the decision's effect on domestic violence 
cases, but refused to carve out a separate forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception for domestic violence victims. 180 The Court did state, 
however, that when an abusive relationship terminates in murder, 
evidence of the intent to isolate the victim to hinder reporting of 
domestic abuse would make a victim's prior statements admissible 
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. 181 The Court also 
stated that earlier abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from seeking 
outside help, would be relevant to a finding that the abuser procured 
the unavailability of the victim. 182 
The Court only discussed instances where the victim is unavailable 
due to murder. 183 The Court did not address how Giles impacts cases 
when victims are unavailable to testify because they are entrapped in 
the cycle of violence. Presumably, the prosecution would need to 
show that during the entire cycle of violence the abuser intended to 
abuse the victim for the purpose of preventing her testimony. 184 But 
what evidence would be used to prove that fact? Prosecutors would 
have evidentiary problems, especially without the cooperation of the 
victim, proving that the intent of the abuser was to keep the victim 
from testifying or seeking help from authorities. 185 The dissent in 
Giles discussed these evidentiary problems: 
Consider H who assaults W, knows she has complained to 
the police, and then murders her. H knows that W will be 
unable to testify against him at any future trial. But who 
knows whether H's knowledge played a major role, a 
middling role, a minor role, or no role at all, in H's decision 
to kill W? Who knows precisely what passed through H's 
mind at the critical moment?186 
Therefore, forfeiture by wrongdoing, a long-standing prosecutorial 
tool in domestic violence cases, has become increasingly more 
difficult to use in light of Giles. 
179. /d. at 2687. 




184. See id. at 2687. 
185. See id. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
186. /d. 
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3. Prosecuting Domestic Violence Under Crawford and its Progeny 
As the prior discussion reveals, introducing a domestic violence 
victim's out-of-court statements when the victim is unavailable has 
become increasingly challenging post-Crawford. The primary 
prosecutorial tools, including 911 calls, statements made to police 
officers, statements made to social workers, and statements made to 
medical personnel are difficult to admit into evidence. With the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requiring proof of intent that the 
abuse was committed for the specific purpose of causing the victim 
not to testify, the admission of hearsay statements in domestic 
violence prosecutions has become severely inhibited. 187 As the next 
section explains, evidence law in Maryland, and most states, offers 
no relief to the challenges of domestic violence prosecutions in light 
of Crawford. 
D. Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Past Acts in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions 
Another method to prosecute domestic violence where the victim is 
unwilling or unable to testify is to introduce evidence of a 
defendant's past acts of domestic violence. The theory is that past 
acts of domestic violence are predictive of future conduct and that if a 
batterer assaulted the victim previously, he has the propensity to have 
assaulted the victim in the current case. 188 Also, past acts of domestic 
violence can help explain the controlling nature of a domestic abuse 
relationship and why a victim does not cooperate or refuses to 
testify. 189 However, current Maryland law, as well as federal law and 
187. See Lindsay Hoopes, Note, The Right to a Fair Trial and the Confrontation Clause: 
Overruling Crawford to Rebalance the U.S. Criminal Justice Equilibrium, 32 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305,341 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
[A] survey of 64 district attorney's offices in the United States 
indicated that [seventy-six] percent of offices were more likely to 
dismiss domestic violence cases post Crawford. For instance, in 
2005 in Dallas County, Texas, judges dismissed 'up to a dozen' 
domestic violence cases per day for problems related to 
Crawford. 
/d. 
188. See Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence 
for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 1115, 1119 (2003). 
189. See id. at 1138-41. 
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most other state law, does not permit the admission into evidence of a 
defendant's past acts of domestic violence under these theories. 190 
1. Current Maryland Law and the Propensity Rule 
The propensity rule excludes evidence offered to prove that a 
person acted in accordance with a prior bad act. 191 The rationale for 
the propensity rule is that past acts have "little probative value as 
circumstantial evidence of how a person acted on one occasion;" that 
is, people sometimes act out of character. 192 The rule is also in place 
because allowing such evidence could cause the fact finder to place 
an undue amount of weight on the prior act, thus hindering a fair 
trial. 193 
Maryland has codified the propensity rule in Maryland Rule 5-
404. 194 Subsection (b) sets forth the propensity rule that prohibits 
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts to show conformity with 
those acts. 195 The rule states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith."196 However, the exception to 
subsection (b) provides that such evidence may "be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident."197 
What does this mean in domestic violence prosecutions? In 
domestic violence prosecutions, prosecutors may argue that 
propensity evidence is relevant to show intent, common plan or 
scheme, and identity. 198 However, admission of a defendant's prior 
190. See MD. R. 5-404; FED. R. EVID. 404; see also 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1, T-9, T-34 to -40 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2009) (illustrating the differences between 
the Federal Rule and various corresponding state rules). 
191. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 404:l(c)(i) (2d ed. 
2001 ), available at Westlaw MDEV -STFED § 404: I. 
192. Jd. § 404:l(c)(ii). 
193. Jd. 
194. See Mo. R. 5-404. 
195. Jd. 
196. I d. The Maryland Rule is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 404. I d.; see also FED. 
R. EviD. 404. 
197. Mo. R. 5-404. 
198. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1128. Maryland requires a three-step analysis to 
admit a past act under one of these exceptions. Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 408, 929 
A.2d 157, 162 (2007) (citing State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 
898 (1989)). 
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acts usually falls short of the requirements for admission under these 
exceptions. 199 For instance, in an admission under a theory of intent 
or accident in a domestic violence case, the defendant will admit the 
act occurred, but assert an accident or self-defense.200 The 
prosecution, in tum, will argue the past acts should be admitted to 
prove the defendant's culpable intent. In Maryland, to admit past 
acts through the intent exception, the prior act must be nearly 
identical to the charged act. 201 However, the similarity is analyzed by 
looking at the specific acts, such as kicking, hitting, pushing, or 
choking. 202 The similarity is not measured through a broader concept 
such as the intent to control a person. 203 Because domestic violence 
incidents tend to be dissimilar in their facts, it is unlikely that a 
defendant's prior act of domestic violence will be admitted under this 
theory. 204 
The theory of identity is triggered in domestic violence cases when 
the victim recants and states that it was someone else that beat her. 205 
In Maryland, to admit prior acts under the identity theory, there must 
be a "distinctive modus operandi" between the current and prior 
First, the court must decide whether the evidence falls within an 
exception to Rule 5-404(b). Second, the court must decide 
'whether the accused's involvement in the other crimes is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.' Finally, the court 
must balance the necessity for, and the probative value of, the 
other crimes evidence against any undue prejudice likely to result 
from its admission. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
199. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1128-29. 
200. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376. 
201. See Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 503, 597 A.2d 956, 963 (1991) (holding that the 
prior act was not admissible when it was "not closely linked in point of time or by 
[the] circumstances"). 
202. Kovach, supra note 188, at 1129-30. 
203. !d. 
204. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376. 
!d. 
For example, it is unlikely that the act of killing a former 
girlfriend's pet would be sufficiently similar to slapping a current 
girlfriend, or stalking an ex-wife. Even though they are 
conceptually similar-violent acts committed upon an intimate 
partner for the purpose of maintaining power, dominance, and 
control-they are factually dissimilar and therefore likely to be 
held inadmissible. 
205. !d. at 3 78. 
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acts.206 Yet, as previously described, domestic violence acts share 
conceptual similarities but not factual similarities.207 For example, 
while a barterer may, on one occasion, choke a victim, and then on a 
subsequent occasion, verbally assault the victim, neither are similar 
enough to be classified as a modus operandi. 
Finally, introducing a defendant's past acts of domestic violence 
through the common plan or scheme exception may seem like the 
most viable option. For example, a prosecutor would attempt to 
admit a defendant's past acts of domestic violence under a theory that 
there is a common plan to control the victim.208 In Maryland, to show 
common plan or scheme, there must be evidence that the defendant 
conceived all the crimes as one grand plan to reach an ultimate 
goal. 209 The fact that the two acts are similar in time and nature do 
not automatically make it a common plan to reach an ultimate goal. 210 
Although it may seem that an abuser has a common plan to control 
the victim, domestic violence is unlike a case where multiple 
robberies were planned together for the ultimate objective of 
obtaining enough money to purchase drugs. 211 Although domestic 
violence-related beatings may be similar, that is not enough to prove 
an ultimate goal needed to suffice admission under the common plan 
exception.212 From the above, it is clear that "non-propensity theories 
often 'do not reflect the realities of domestic violence. "'213 
206. See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:11. See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 
634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613, 375 A.2d 551, 
556 (1977). 
207. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376; Kovach, supra note 188, at 1130. 
208. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1124-30. 
209. See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 712,415 A.2d 830, 839 (1980) ("[The] exception 
permits the admission of evidence of other crimes when the several offenses are so 
connected or blended in point of time or circumstances that they form one transaction, 
and cannot be fully shown or explained without proving the others."); McLAIN, supra 
note 191, § 404:9. 
210. MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:9; see also Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 123-24, 
823 A.2d 696, 730 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003). 
211. See State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 244, 395 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1979); see also MCLAIN, 
supra note 191, § 404:9. 
212. Cf Reidnauer v. State, 133 Md. App. 311, 323-24, 755 A.2d 553, 559--60 (Ct. Spec. 
App. 2000) (arguing that while two rapes may be similar, one still needs to 
demonstrate a common goal). 
213. Kovach, supra note 188, at 1129 (quoting Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's 
Complicity in Intimate Violence Against Women, 33 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 773, 819 
(1997)). 
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2. A Countercurrent to the Norm: California Evidence Code 
Section 1109 and Similar Statutes 
a. California Evidence Code Section 1109 
In 1996, the California Legislature enacted California Evidence 
Code section 1109, partly in response to the fury over the exclusion 
of prior acts of domestic violence in the O.J. Simpson case where the 
prosecution attempted, but was denied, the admission of past 
domestic violence acts O.J. Simpson committed against his wife 
Nicole Brown Simpson, to prove a course of conduct that culminated 
in murder.214 Section 1109 permits the introduction of prior acts of 
domestic violence that the propensity rule would otherwise 
exclude.215 Through case law and the application of section 1109, 
214. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 168. The enacted legislation came to be known as the 
"Nicole Brown Simpson Law." /d. To see a full analysis on the prosecution's theory 
of attempting to admit prior acts of domestic abuse in the Simpson case, see Myrna S. 
Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1996). 
215. See CAL. Evm. CODE§ 1109 (West 2009). The relevant portion of the statute reads: 
(a)(l) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal 
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving 
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of 
other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 
if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352. 
(b) 1n an action in which evidence is to be offered under this 
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, 
including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance 
of any testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance 
with the provisions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code. 
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the 
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court 
determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of 
justice." 
§ 1109. 
The first proposal for the statute was made by Lisa Marie De Sanctis, a Deputy 
District Attorney in the Ventura County District Attorney's Office. DeSanctis, supra 
note 43, at 361. Ms. De Sancris recognized the problem inherent in domestic violence 
prosecutions and modeled a proposal similar to Federal Rules of Evidence 413,414, 
and 415. !d. California's propensity rule is codified at CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101 
(West 2009). 
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uncharged216 prior acts of domestic violence committed against the 
same victim217 or different victims are admissible.218 
b. Similar acts from other states 
A few other states have introduced rules similar to section 1109 
with varying degrees of admissibility for prior acts. Colorado, for 
example, allows evidence of prior domestic violence between the 
defendant and other victims.219 The statute states that the General 
Assembly of Colorado recognizes the cyclical nature of domestic 
violence and the "pattern[] of abuse."220 Colorado courts have 
recognized that the legislature intended that trial courts would allow 
prior acts into evidence, specifically through common plan221 or 
intent,222 as opposed to prior acts normally excluded under these two 
theories. 223 The past act must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, 224 and a limiting instruction must be given to the jury 
advising them not to punish the defendant for the past acts but to use 
such evidence only to show propensity for committing the current 
charge.225 
Minnesota has a statute that provides, "[ e ]vidence of similar 
conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic abuse, or 
against other family or household members, is admissible unless the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice."226 Although it may seem that most prior acts of domestic 
violence would be unfairly prejudicial under the statute, it has been 
"interpreted not as permitting propensity evidence, but rather as 
216. Kovach, supra note 188, at ll33 (citing People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212 
(Ct. App. 2000)); Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 168-69. The reason charged acts are 
not allowed relates back to the legislative intent: "This provision allows the admission 
of evidence of past acts of domestic violence, not convictions." SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, BILL ANALYSIS, 1995-1996 Sess., at 8 (Ca. 1996), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bi!Vsen/sb _1851-1900/sb _1876 _ cfa 
_960408 _ll 0911_ sen_ comrn.htrnl. 
217. People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212 (Ct. App. 2000). 
218. People v. Brown, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433,437-39 (Ct. App. 2000). 
219. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5(2) (West 2004). 
220. ld. § 18-6-801.5(1). 
221. People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Colo. App. 2001). 
222. People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822, 828 (Colo. App. 2000). 
223. See supra Part III.D.l. 
224. People v. Moore, 117 P.3d l, 3 (Colo. App. 2004). 
225. See Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5(5). 
226. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West 2009). The court only needs to find that the 
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect to admit the prior act; no standard 
such as clear and convincing evidence needs to be met. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 
153, 159 (Minn. 2004). 
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allowing evidence of the history of the victim and defendant's 
relationship. "227 Evidence of prior acts under this statute would 
include "evidence of domestic abuse, violation of an order for 
protection ... [and] violation of a harassment restraining order. "228 
Lastly, the Alaska Legislature allows "evidence of other crimes 
involving domestic violence by the defendant against the same or 
another person" to be admitted in a prosecution involving domestic 
violence or interfering with a report of a crime involving domestic 
violence. 229 
IV. PROPOSAL: IN THE WAKE OF CRAWFORD, MARYLAND 
SHOULD ADOPT A STATUTE SIMILAR TO SECTION 1109 
TO HELP QUELL THE DIFFICULTIES OF PROSECUTING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Prior to Crawford, it was understandable that Maryland did not 
have a law similar to section 1109. However, the interplay between 
Crawford and Maryland Rule 5-404(b) necessitates a reevaluation of 
current Maryland evidence law. Before Crawford, past acts of 
domestic violence would have been helpful, but not essential, to a 
prosecution.230 Even without the victim's cooperation or testimony, 
prosecutors could rely on victims' hearsay statements to paint a 
picture of the domestic abuse. 231 However, the Court's decision in 
Crawford severely limits the use of victims' hearsay statements in 
domestic violence prosecutions.232 Lacking the ability to rely on 
hearsay statements, prosecutors are left with few tools to use in 
domestic violence prosecutions when the victim is unavailable or 
refuses to cooperate. Without the ability to introduce a defendant's 
past acts of domestic violence, prosecutors are unable to tell the full 
story of the abusive relationship or use their value as a predictor of 
future domestic violence to convict the defendant, causing many 
domestic violence prosecutions to be dismissed. 233 Because of the 
unique nature of domestic violence and domestic violence 
227. Kovach, supra note 188, at 1147. 
228. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20. 
229. ALASKA R. Evm. 404(b)(4); Kovach, supra note 188, at 1141. The Alaska statute 
differs from the Minnesota statute in that Minnesota does not allow evidence of past 
domestic violence against a different victim, while Alaska is similar to California in 
allowing evidence of prior domestic abuse against a different victim. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
232. See supra Part Ill. C. 
233. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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prosecutions where the victim routinely is not cooperative (especially 
in Maryland with the "one free slap" rule), 234 the Crawford decision, 
its progeny, and Maryland Rule 5-404(b), the balance has tipped 
sharply in favor of the defendant/batterer in domestic violence 
prosecutions and away from the search for truth. In light of 
Crawford, it is time to provide the prosecution and the victim another 
tool in domestic violence prosecutions. 
A. Proposal 
A statute similar to section 1109, and other statutes previously 
discussed, would provide such a tool while still protecting a 
defendant's rights. A proper Maryland statute should allow for the 
admission of a defendant's uncharged235 prior acts of domestic abuse 
against the current victim only in a prosecution for domestic 
violence. Evidence, including pictures or testimony, such as that 
from a witness or police officer, would be used to prove the prior acts 
of domestic violence in the current prosecution.236 The statute should 
state that prior acts include, but are not limited to, evidence of prior 
domestic abuse and violation of any type of protective order. 237 
The statute should also provide for a limitation that allows only the 
admission of past acts that occurred in the last ten years. 
Furthermore, the statute should specifically state that the past acts 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, or if a higher 
standard is desired, clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, notice 
must be given to the defendant that the prior acts will be used, 
describing the testimony and evidence that will be used to prove the 
past acts. 
In addition, the statute should provide a jury instruction that will 
inform the jury that prior acts alone cannot meet the prosecution's 
burden of proving the elements of the charged offense; therefore, 
234. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (LexisNexis 2006). 
235. Although prior charged conduct is just as relevant to elaborate on the control in the 
relationship, its inclusion would greatly impact a defendant's rights because, when the 
conviction would be introduced at trial, a jury might automatically infer guilt of the 
current charge based on a prior conviction causing the defendant to be punished again 
for an already convicted charge. See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:l(c)(ii). 
236. See Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 181. For example, a neighbor may testify that she 
heard yelling and loud noises coming from the house. A police officer may testify 
that he responded to the house for a domestic violence call. 
As will be discussed below, all evidentiary and constitutional procedures would be 
followed when proving a past act of domestic violence. See infra Part IV.A.3.c. 
23 7. Including the violation of a protective order as a prior act is important because such a 
violation continues to show the extreme control that the barterer exerts over the 
victim. 
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prior acts should only be used to elaborate on the controlling nature 
of the relationship and that prior acts are predictive, but not an 
ultimate indicator, of guilt for the current charge.238 Of course, the 
prior act will be balanced to determine if its prejudicial effect 
substantially outweighs its probative value as required by Maryland 
Rule 5-403.239 
1. Why Such a Rule Works: Prior Acts ofDomestic Violence Are 
Extremely Probative in Proving that the Defendant Committed 
the Charged Crime and Explaining the Controlling Nature of an 
Abusive Relationship 
One of the main reasons that such an evidentiary rule will work is 
because domestic violence is a recidivistic crime, making prior acts 
of domestic violence "'[t]he best predictor of future violence."'240 
Studies show that once violence occurs in a relationship, it reoccurs 
sixty-three percent of the time.241 Therefore, a past act is highly 
predictive of guilt on the current charge. Although other crimes such 
as robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are recidivistic 
crimes as well/42 a statute that permits past acts to be admitted in 
those cases is not needed. These crimes do not require an 
explanation of the extreme level of control as in an abusive 
relationship.243 For example, if a victim is not testifying in a larceny 
prosecution, a defendant's prior act of larceny is not likely to explain 
the victim's absence; whereas, in a domestic violence case, a 
defendant's prior acts of abuse can explain the controlling nature of 
the relationship and provide an explanation for why the victim is not 
cooperating or testifying. 
238. See People v. James, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 830-31 (Ct. App. 2000). 
239. Mo. R. 5-403. 
240. Kelly A. Zinna & Michael Gelles, Domestic Violence and Stalking, Mo. B.J., Sept.-
Oct. 2003, at 54-55. 
241. Steven R. Morrison, Creating Sex Offender Registries: The Religious Right and the 
Failure to Protect Society's Vulnerable, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 23, 72 (2007). "Nearly a 
third of female victims of nonlethal intimate violence were victimized at least twice 
during the previous 6 months." LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR 
FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 15 (1998), available at http://bjs 
data.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. 
242. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDNISM 
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 at 1 (2002), available at http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.htm. 
243. See Kuennen, supra note 56, at 10. 
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Allowing past acts that are predictive of a certain crime into 
evidence is not a novel idea. Congress has taken notice of the 
predictive nature of other, certain recidivistic crimes.244 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence 413-415 make admissible past acts of sexual 
abuse and child molestation in a prosecution of sexual abuse or child 
molestation. 245 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also 
recognized that in sexual assault cases against the same victim, prior 
sexual assaults against the current victim are probative and 
admissible.246 
In Maryland, the courts and the General Assembly have already 
pointed to the predictive accuracy of past acts of domestic violence. 
Accordingly, an adoption of the proposal would not be anomalous. 
For example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Coburn v. 
Coburn/47 held that past acts of domestic violence can be used in a 
final protective order hearing. The court stated that "[ t ]he fact that 
there is a history of prior abusive acts implies that there is a stronger 
likelihood of future abuse. "248 The current statute that governs 
protective orders specifies that the petitioner of the order should 
include prior acts of domestic violence. 249 In addition, the statute that 
governs child custody allows a court to consider past acts of domestic 
violence. 250 
In a brief to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, for a case 
on appeal because prior acts of domestic violence were admitted for a 
current charge of domestic violence, the State argued that the court 
should extend the exception for sexual assaults, mentioned above, to 
domestic violence cases. 251 Although this is commendable and 
244. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, 
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 3, 11 (2008). 
245. See FED. R. Evm. 413-415; Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 180-81. To see a 
discussion on Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, see Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 
161-64. Maryland does not have an equivalent to Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
415. See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 413:1. 
246. Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1238 (1993); Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 
458,466,554 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1989). 
247. 342Md.244,674A.2d951 (1996). 
248. !d. at 258, 674 A.2d at 958. The court did address prior acts in Rule 5-404(b). The 
court stated that Rule 5-404(b) was inapplicable in this case because the facts at hand 
related to a protective order proceeding and not a criminal proceeding. Id at 260, 674 
A.2d at 959. However, nowhere did the court address the value of the predictive 
nature of a defendant's prior acts of domestic abuse in relation to guilt on a criminal 
charge of domestic violence. 
249. See Mo. CooEANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-504 (LexisNexis 2009). 
250. See Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 9-101.1 (LexisNexis 2006). 
251. Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 14, Howard v. Maryland, No. 2914 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2008), 2008 WL 5023427. 
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recognizes the Office of the Attorney General's belief that a 
defendant's past acts of domestic violence are predictive of guilt on a 
current charge, a statute as described above would be the proper 
method to enact change because it would give precise guidelines to 
protect the defendant's rights versus a change of the rule through case 
law which may not be as specific and fail to provide proper 
safeguards. 
2. Positive Aspects of the Proposal and Section 1109 
a. The admission of prior acts helps the jury evaluate the victim's 
credibility 
When a victim happens to testify in a domestic violence 
prosecution, the jurors may find it difficult to believe the victim. 252 
They may blame the victim for not leaving the relationship and may 
not understand the intricacies of the relationship. 253 When the victim 
does not testify there is also juror bias; it is hard to understand why a 
person would not testify after being abused. 254 The jury may also feel 
that the current charged crime was an isolated event or an accident. 255 
Therefore, the jury is less likely to believe the accusation against the 
defendant. 256 
Section 1109 and the proposal would allow the victim's testimony 
or the state's accusation of domestic violence to be corroborated and 
prove the truth of the charged crime. 257 Also, when a victim does not 
testify but the defendant does, admitting past acts of domestic 
violence limits the ability of the defendant to deny or fabricate 
testimony.258 The goal of a trial is to keep the "focus [on] the truth-
seeking process," and section 1109 and the proposal accomplish this 
252. See Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 181. 
253. Jd. 
254. See id. 
255. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1152. 
256. It is still possible to have an expert testify as to the intricacies of the relationship and 
why the victim is not present. Although this scenario is plausible, the cost of an 
expert for each domestic violence prosecution where the victim does not testify is not 
economically sound. Also, it is possible that the jury will disregard the expert. See 
JENNIFER G: LoNG, NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S Ass'N, INTRODUCING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN VICTIM BEHAVIOR IN SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS 18-19, 22, 34 (National District Attorneys Association: American 
Prosecutors Research Institute 2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub _ 
introducing_ expert_ testimony.pdf. 
257. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182. 
258. Id. 
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by allowing the jury to obtain an unbiased perspective of the 
victim.259 
b. Judicial efficiency will not be decreased 
Opponents argue that allowing past acts of domestic violence may 
create "mini trials" because the defendant would be able to deny the 
prior acts. 260 However, there are aspects of section 1109 and the 
proposal that counteract this argument. Currently, the admission of 
any prior acts of domestic violence rests on a judicial determination 
of relevance and then admission through a narrow exception.261 
Section 1109 and the proposal make prior acts automatically relevant 
and eliminate any judicial inquiry into a finding of relevance or a 
finding of admission through a narrow exception. 262 If there are 
numerous past acts, a judge may be able to limit all those admissions 
on the grounds of waste of time, a rule that is found in the Maryland 
Rules of Evidence. 263 
Also at the trial level, judicial efficiency is increased because 
defendants are more willing to enter into plea bargains or seek 
treatment, reducing court costs. Having an abuser realize that past 
acts can be used against him could trigger accountability and 
treatment, thus breaking the cycle of abuse and reducing the number 
of domestic violence incidents in the future. 264 
At the appellate level, any decrease in judicial efficiency will be 
negligible. Although the courts may have to conduct a review on 
whether the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the probative 
value of the prior act of domestic violence, those courts no longer 
need to evaluate trial courts' admission of prior acts of domestic 
violence for relevance or under an exception. 265 
Therefore, although a similar statute to section 1109 may decrease 
judicial efficiency in certain areas, it will, in turn, increase efficiency 
259. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1143. 
260. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 392. 
261. Linell A. Letendre, Notes & Comments, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why 
Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic 
Violence, 75 WASH. L. REv. 973, 1002 (2000). 
262. See id. Judges and lawyers will no longer need to spend time determining, for 
example, if a prior act is so similar to the charged act that it could be admitted. See 
De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 394. 
263. MD. R. 5-403; see also De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 393 (noting the time and effort 
required by attorneys and judges to admit numerous prior acts of domestic violence). 
264. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182-83. 
265. Letendre, supra note 261, at 1002. 
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in other areas, nullifying any dramatic decrease in judicial efficiency 
on the whole. 
c. It works 
There have been numerous positive effects with regard to domestic 
violence prosecutions in those jurisdictions that have implemented 
section 1109 or a similar statute.266 For example, California 
prosecutors have noted that "section 1109 has proved invaluable in 
convicting recidivist batterers. "267 Alaska prosecutors also report a 
strengthened ability to prosecute domestic violence cases because of 
the legislation enacted. 268 One reason the statutes are so effective is 
because allowing past acts is a powerful tool to explain the victim's 
behavior and it prevents juries from blaming the victim.269 As one 
prosecutor described it, "the defendant sounds 'incredibly foolish' 
when arguing that the victim attacked him or fabricated the story 
when the prosecution is able to call prior domestic violence victims 
as witnesses to support the instant victim.'mo 
The statutes have also increased reporting of domestic violence. 
When victims knew that a conviction was more likely, or that 
reporting a domestic violence incident could be used later at a trial, 
reporting and, in turn, intervention of batterers by domestic violence 
professionals occurred more often. 271 
3. Defendant's Rights are Protected 
Opponents of section 11 09 and the proposal argue that such statutes 
greatly prejudice the defendant's rights at trial. 272 However, section 
1109 and the proposal provide safeguards that are designed to protect 
the defendant. 
a. Written protections in the statute and proposal ensure 
defendant's rights 
Disclosing testimony and evidence that will be used to prove the 
past acts of domestic violence of the defendane73 enables the 
266. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1138, 1143. 
267. /d. at 1138. 
268. /d. at 1143. 
269. /d. 
270. See id. at 1138. 
271. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182-83. 
272. See id. at 166. 
273. See CAL. EviD. CODE§ 1109(b) (West 2009). 
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defendant to prepare a proper defense and counter the accusations of 
the past acts. Requiring the past acts of domestic violence to have 
occurred within the past ten years274 allows the defendant to reform 
his conduct without having a prior act of domestic violence haunt 
him, thus providing another way section 1109 and the proposal 
protect the defendant's rights. 
In the proposal, the requirement that the past act of domestic 
violence be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (or in the 
alternative, by clear and convincing evidence) protects the 
defendant's rights because the prosecution will have to substantiate 
their claims of past acts of domestic violence, thus limiting the 
admission of false claims into evidence. 275 The requirement of a jury 
instruction would also protect the defendant's rights by ensuring that 
the jury only uses the evidence of prior acts for limited purposes. 276 
Having prior acts admissible as long as the prejudicial effect does 
not substantially outweigh the probative value also protects the 
defendant's right by excluding the extreme past act where a judge 
determines that a jury would be unable to properly use the past act. 277 
The requirement in the proposal that only past acts of domestic 
violence against the current victim be admitted into evidence is 
another safeguard in place to safeguard the defendant's rights. 
Although others have argued that past domestic violence against any 
prior victim is predictive of a current domestic violence charge, 278 
allowing a past act of domestic violence against only the current 
victim in the case better explains how the past act predicts the 
probability that the defendant committed the current charge and 
better elaborates on the controlling environment of the current 
relationship. A past act of domestic violence committed against a 
different victim would not have the same predictive or explanatory 
value and would unduly burden the defendant. 279 
274. !d. § 1109(e). Section 1109 allows the admission of ten-year-old prior acts of 
domestic violence that are in the interest of justice. !d. 
275. See People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 2004). 
276. See supra Part III.D.2.b. 
277. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1352 (West 2009); id. § 11 09(a)(1 ); Mo. R. 5-403. However, 
California courts rarely find that a prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of 
evidence of prior acts. See, e.g., People v. Dallas, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521 (Ct. App. 
2008); People v. Williams, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct. App. 2008); People v. Morton, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827 (Ct. App. 2008); People v. Cabrera, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Ct. 
App. 2007). 
278. See Letendre, supra note 261, at 977. 
279. See GREENFIELD ET AL., supra note 241, at 15 ("Nearly a third of female victims of 
nonlethal intimate violence were victimized at least twice during the previous six 
months."). Cf State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920, 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 889 
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b. The problem of false claims 
Opponents of section 1109 also argue that in the event of a false 
claim, either in the current charge or a claim of a past act of domestic 
violence, the defendant's rights will be infringed.28° For example, if 
the victim fabricates the current charge, then a legitimate past act of 
domestic violence could be used to his detriment at trial. However, 
the pioneer of section 1109, Marie De Sanctis, responds with her 
anti-coincidence argument.281 She states that it is very unlikely that 
one man would twice be the victim of a false accusation of domestic 
violence.282 Therefore, either the prior incident or the current 
accusation is valid. Second, a man falsely accused of domestic 
violence would probably not have a history of domestic violence as 
so few domestic violence incidents are ever reported. 283 Therefore, 
the innocent defendant falsely accused of domestic violence would 
rarely or never have a past domestic violence incident haunt him and 
would be unaffected by section 1109 or the proposal. 
c. Constitutional protections on equal protection and due process 
grounds 
Defendants that have challenged the admission of prior acts 
evidence have argued that the statutes are unconstitutional on equal 
protection and due process grounds.284 However, states such as 
California and Alaska, rejected challenges to such statutes on 
constitutional grounds. 285 
In People v. Jennings/86 the California Court of Appeal upheld 
section 1109 against an equal protection challenge.287 The defendant 
P.2d 487 (Wash. 1999) ("Such [prior acts] evidence is generally inadmissible because 
it could lead a jury to determine that a defendant committed the crime with which he 
or she is charged simply because he or she committed a similar crime in the past."). 
280. See De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 390-92 (outlining critics' arguments that defendants 
are falsely accused because of pressure by law enforcement, that women exaggerate 
or imagine abusive incidents after finding out about prior acts of domestic violence, 
and that juries do not effectively weigh inflammatory evidence). 
281. /d. at 390-92. 
282. /d. 
283. /d. at 391. 
284. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Hoover, 
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (Ct. 
App. 2000); People v. Poplar, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Fuzzard 
v. State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
285. See supra note 284. 
286. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727. 
287. /d. at 734. 
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argued that treating those accused of domestic violence differently 
from those accused of other crimes violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 288 The court reasoned that defming a class in legislation is 
permissible as long as the distinctions have some relevance to the 
purpose of defining the classes. 289 The court concluded that the 
distinction of domestic violence defendants is relevant to the 
legislative purpose of easing the difficulty of domestic violence 
prosecutions for which the distinction was made. 290 
In People v. Johnson, 291 the California Court of Appeal for the 
Third District held section 1109 valid against a due process 
challenge. 292 The court found that section 11 09 is analogous to 
California Evidence Code section 1108, which allows the admission 
of prior sex offenses in a sex offense case. 293 The court then pointed 
to the case People v. F alsetta, 294 where the court upheld section 1108 
against a due process challenge. In Falsetta, the California Supreme 
Court concluded that section 1108 does not violate due process 
because it has adequate defendant safeguards similar to those in 
section 1109.295 Although it cannot be definitively stated that the 
Maryland appellate courts will follow the same reasoning as the 
California courts or that Maryland courts will hold the Maryland 
Constitution to the same protective standard as that of California or 
the U.S. Constitution, it can be inferred that a proposal similar to 
section 1109 is on sound constitutional grounds with respect to equal 
protection and due process. 
d. Constitutional protections under the Confrontation Clause 
Section 1109 and the proposal are still subject to the protections of 
the Confrontation Clause and Crawford, further protecting the 
defendant's rights. Any evidence or testimony a prosecutor uses to 
prove a past act of domestic violence must survive an analysis under 
Crawford and its progeny, otherwise it will be inadmissible.296 For 
288. /d. 
289. !d. at 735 (referencing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1975)). 
290. !d. 
291. 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596. 
292. !d. at 597. 
293. !d. at 600; CAL. Evro. CODE§ 1108 (West 2009). 
294. 986 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1999). 
295. !d. at 188. Compare § 1108 (providing certain safeguards to the defendant, including 
disclosure of the evidence to the defendant), with § 1109 (providing the same 
safeguards to the defendant, in addition to a ten-year limitation for admitting evidence 
of prior acts). 
296. Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the "Testimonial 
Statements" Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 387, 
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example, the victim's testimonial statements made in Giles, 
ultimately held inadmissible, were originally admitted through 
section 11 09.297 
The fact that evidence admitted under section 1109 or the proposal 
are subject to Crawford and its progeny may make it seem that the 
difficulties of proving a domestic violence claim under Crawford and 
its progeny would resurface. However, the benefits of a statute 
similar to section 1109 are not neutralized. Because the standard of 
proof in the proposal is a preponderance of the evidence (or, in the 
alternative, clear and convincing evidence) less evidence is needed to 
prove the prior act. This means that proof of a prior act of domestic 
violence can be established without aid of testimonial statements by 
the defendant and proven instead through non-testimonial evidence 
such as witness statements, photographs, and testimony from police 
officers responding to an ongoing emergency, etc. 298 Therefore, 
Crawford's effect on section 11 09 and a similar statute would not be 
significant while still preserving the defendant's rights under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence creates a unique type of prosecution where 
physical evidence may be lacking and the victim often recants, 
refuses to cooperate, or is murdered. 299 While hearsay exceptions 
prior to Crawford offered a solution, post Crawford prosecutorial 
tools such as 911 calls, statements made to doctors or social workers, 
and the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception have become more 
difficult to use. 30° Crawford, along with the propensity rule, has 
created a scenario where domestic violence prosecutions have 
become arduous. Difficult prosecutions may mean an increase in the 
already daunting domestic violence statistics. Those like Veronica 
Williams will not have justice served. 
The proposal for a statute similar to section 1109 allows juries to 
consider past acts to show a disposition for guilt on the current charge 
of domestic violence and provide context of the controlling nature of 
399 (2005). See, e.g., People v. Moran, No. B204002, 2009 WL 162293, at *I (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009); People v. Suniga, No. F052710, 2008 WL 3090622, at *13 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008); People v. Younger, No. All0031, 2007 WL 1848976, at *9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
297. See People v. Giles, No. Bl66937, 2009 WL 457832, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
298. See supra Part III.C.2. 
299. See supra Part II.B. 
300. See supra Part lii.C.2. 
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the abusive relationship. 301 Enacting such a statute would provide a 
solution to the obstacles prosecutors face in domestic violence cases 
post-Crawford while still safeguarding a defendant's rights in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution. 
This proposal is not a novel idea. Other states joined California 
even before Crawford became a hindrance to domestic violence 
cases. 302 Maryland courts and the legislature have indicated a belief 
that a past act of domestic violence has predictive value for a future 
act of domestic violence. 303 The next logical step, in the wake of 
Crawford and its progeny, is to adopt a statute similar to the proposal 
described. A victim of domestic violence will again have some 
protection when she cannot testify or refuses to testify. The search 
for truth would again be in harmony with a defendant's rights m 
domestic violence prosecutions. 
Jay A. Abarbanel 
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